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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the legislature to exercise the power is an encroachment
upon the powers of the judiciary and unconstitutional.
It appears that the court, recognizing the general rules
applicable to the situation, but wishing to decide the ques-
tion fairly, has manufactured a distinction between judg-
ments wherein private interests are involved and those in-
volving only public interests. This amazing distinction
seems to have never been recognized before. From a study
of various authorities, 3 it is safe to say that no such dis-
tinction exists. If a judgment has been entered, it is im-
material whether the interests therein involved are public
or private it follows as a fixed and basic principle of con-
stitutional law that the legislature cannot reverse the judg-
ment.
W. Reese Hitchens
PROBATION ON CONDITION PRISONER
LEAVE STATE
In a recent Michigan case' where the defendant, con-
victed of a violation of the Michigan liquor law, was sent-
enced to pay a fine and within thirty days leave the state
for a period of probation, which was fixed at five years,
the Supreme Court reversed the sentence of the lower court
and remanded the case for imposition of a legal sentence.
The appellate court held that the sentence was not author-
ized specifically by statute and was contrary to public pol-
icy. What would be the result if a similar case arose in
Pennsylvania today?
The Michigan statute in terms gives the court the
power to impose such lawful conditions of probation as the
circumstances of the case may require or warrant2 except
in cases of murder, treason, robbery while armed, or break-
131ncluding Black, Cooley, White, Ruling Case Law, Corpus
Juris, etc.
'People v. Baum, 231 N. W. 95 (Mich. 1930).
tMich. Public Acts 1927, Number 175, c. 11, Sec. 2.
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ing and entering a dwelling house at night and in the cases
of those who are likely again to engage in criminal conduct
and those twice convicted of felony.
Pennsylvania has a similar statute granting power to
the court to suspend the imposition of the sentence, and
place the defendant on probation, on such terms and con-
ditions as it may deem right and proper in any case where
a person shall be convicted of any crime, except murder,
administering poison, kidnapping, incest, sodomy, assault
with intent to rape, arson or burglary of an inhabited dwell-
ing house if it does not appear to the said court that the
defendant has ever before been imprisoned for crime and
where said court believes that the character of the defend-
ant and the circumstances of the case are such that he or
she is not likely again to engage in an offensive course of
conduct and the public good does not demand or require
that the defendant should suffer the penalty imposed by
law.3 An examination of these two statutes does not dis-
close any material distinctions.
There are two possible attacks to be made on the
legality of such punishment, viz: unconstitutionality and
public policy. The federal constitution and the majority
of state constitutions have sections prohibiting "cruel and
unusual punishments".' Exact classification of punishments
within the meaning of such sections are rare5 but these pro-
visions seem to be enacted primarily to abolish punishment
involving physical torture.' It seems that such constitu-
tional prohibitions are directed against any cruel or de-
grading punishment not known to the common law, and
probably also any degrading punishments which, in the par-
ticular state, had become obsolete when its constitution
was adopted.
7
sWest St. 5502; 1909, P. "L. 495.
4United States Constit. Amend. VIII; Mich. Constit. Article 2,
Sect. 15.
8Wilkerson v. U. S., 99 U. S. 130, 135, 136 (1878).
6Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Phila. Rep. 146 (1902); People v. Morris,
80 Mich. 634, 45 N. W. 591 (1890).
'Black's Constit. Law, 510.
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The Constitution of Pennsylvania omits the word "un-
usual"' in its section and prohibits only "cruel" punishments.'
It seems that although such a punishment may be unusual
in that it had become obsolete when the Pennsylvania con-
stitution was adopted, since the constitution omits the term
"unusual" we may fairly conclude that such sentence should
not be unconstitutional on the ground that it was expressly
prohibited by its language. It is clear that this mode of
punishment does not violate the constitutional provision
directed against "cruel" punishments because it cannot be
said that a probational period beyond the limits of a state
involves physical torture.9
Banishment was a common punishment in Rome and
was prevalent throughout the Roman law.10
The common law did not favor banishment as a pun-
ishment and it was said "no power on earth, except the
authority of Parliament, can send any subject of England
out of the land against his will; no, not even a crim-
inal * * * * except by the judgment of his peers or the law of
the land.11 Some punishments consist in exile or banish-
ment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation ** *"12
Banishment or exile seems to have been used in England
at one time to punish a person for a crime in those cases
where the ordinary punishment was death, but where the
court did not wish to impose the capital punishment because
of the prisoner's position in the government or church. 13
In 1700 an act was passed in Pennsylvania whereby it was
provided that where a prisoner was convicted of theft and
sentenced to wear a badge of thievery for six months, the
court could banish the prisoner forever on the second fail-
8Penna. Constit., Art. 1, Sect. 13.
QSee Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 730, 13 Sup. Ct. 1013,
1028 (1892); In Re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. 905, 910 (1884); State v.
Smith, I Bailey 283, 287 (S. C. 1829). But Cf. dissent in U. S. v. Jue
Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 279, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 653 (1904).
' 0Radin on Roman Law, 470.
111 Black. Com. 137.
124 Black. Com. 377.
132 Pitchairn's Criminal Trials, 494 (1606).
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ure to wear the badge. This statute was repealed five
years later.14
The Michigan case was reversed on the ground it was
against public policy; the court arguing it meant sending
dangerous citizens into sister states. Perhaps the court
overlooked the fact that the statute particularly excepts
criminals convicted of certain flagitious and immoral crimes
and probation on any condition may not be granted to
them. 5
What of the fact that a prisoner is not compelled to
go-but as between two evils he chooses the lesser and of
his own volition makes his exit? Is it not expedient for
a first offender to go to another state and reform himself
into a law-abiding citizen where the stigma of his past
cannot follow and be prejudicial to his opportunities? Also
there seems to be no sentiment expressed against the con-
stitutionality or against the policy of a governor pardon-
ing a prisoner on condition that he leave the state.' One
New York case held it a valid condition where the governor
pardoned a prisoner with the proviso that he leave the
country.
17
Despite the fact that such punishment was odious to
the English common law, and that the common law of
Pennsylvania is composed "partly of the common law of
England and partly of our own usages,"'8 if such a case
arose within this jurisdiction today, it should be decided
contrary to the Michigan case.
Herbert Horn
1411 Pa. Statutes at Large 10 and note.
'5supra, note 3.
1660 A. L. R. 1415; Com. v. Haggerty, 4 Brewster (Pa.) 326 (1869).
As to such conditional pardon in England, see 29 Cyc. 571 note 60.
17People v. Potter, 1 Park, Crim. Rep. (N. Y.) 47 (1829); Flavell's
Case, 8 W. & S. (Pa.) 197 (1844).
18 Com, v. Degrange, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 181 (1929); Guardians of
Poor v. Greene, 5 Binney 554 (1813); Com. v. Lehigh Valley R. R.,
165 Pa. 162 (1894).
